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BAUCUS
Remarks of Senator Max Baucus
United States-China Business Council
Wednesday, July 15, 1998
Good afternoon everyone and welcome. I am
pleased to have the opportunity to share with you
some of my reflections about my trip to China with
President Clinton. I also want to talk about why I think
it is important that we continue on a road toward
strengthening our strategic relationship with China.
Before I begin, I would just like to take a moment
to thank my long-time friend, Bob Kapp, who has done
a masterful job as president of U.S.-China Business
Council. Your work has made a real difference in
improving Sino-American relations.
Let me also recognize the Council's long-time
executive director, Richard Brecher. As you all know,
Richard has recently moved on to new things. But let
me say that his work on MFN status and trade with
China has been irreplaceable ever since the MFN debate
began. He deserves our thanks and applause.
Let me now move on to the topic at hand.
President Clinton's visit to China was the first
presidential mission since 1 989 An event like this
offers us a chance to ask ourselves the basic question:
What do we want our relationship with China to be?
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Our goal should be to encourage China to adopt
'< the standards that most of the world accepts. And -
these include human rights and the rule of law at
home; reciprocal open markets; restrictions on
weapons sales; and cooperation on the crucial security
issues. Adopting these values are in China's best
interest, as well as our own.
Easier said than done.
Some fundamental issues remain unresolved.
China still, I believe, hopes to emter the world economy
without fully opening itself.
3
:1.t.
While I believe most Chinese are enthusiastic about a
warmer relationship, I still think the country has not
budged on many the of the critical issues. And |7
certainly the American public and Congress is not
confident about China's long-term intentions.
But that said, the trends in most major issues are
in the right direction. And our task, then, is to
encourage them. And engagement with China,
including events like the Presidential visit, is a means to
that end.
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Critics have asked whether the trip was worth it. I
would reply with a resounding yes. Let me tell you
why.
This trip succeeded because it built confidence at
the highest levels of government. Confidence that will
allow us to manage our problems before they erupt into
crisis. And this trip is helping us work out complicated
issues, such as China's efforts in the trade arena.
Before the trip, I stated my belief that engagement
with China was a means to an end. I think now -
more than ever - China needs the United States to
help bring it into the 21st Century.
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That's my observation from this trip and previous trips
to China.
OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
This trip proved that if we engage China, as the
president and delegation did, we can speak directly to
the Chinese people about the importance of creating
strategic partnerships and about American values.
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By going to China, the president delivered our
message - a message of democracy, freedom, human
rights, free markets -- to hundreds of millions of
Chinese people. That was historic. It was a powerful
symbol that demonstrated very publicly our
expectations for reform in China.
As the leader of the congressional delegation, I had
the chance to meet with Chinese officials and experts
who shared their candid views about the state of our
relationship. From the Chinese military officers at the
National Defense University to the students at Fudan
University in Shanghai, the theme of this trip could best
be summarized as "knowledge is power."
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And so we and the Chinese must continue to gain
knowledge from each other, to develop a mutually
beneficial dialogue about each other and about our still-
fledgling relationship
CHINA TRADE AS AN ECONOMIC ISSUE
What did I personally learn on this trip? Trade
continues to be a big problem. Huge. Getting worse.
To date, our goal has been to open trade through a
successful WTO accession, which would further open
the Chinese market to our goods and services.
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At the same it would allow us to move forward on
full normalization of trade relations, including
permanent Normal Trade Relations status (formerly
called Most Favored Nation trading status).
That is the right goal. But negotiations have
stalled. In fact, we have lost ground in terms of our
market access. During my visit, I pressed the issue of
trade at every level - from President Jiang, to Premier
Zhu, to the Ministers of Trade and Agriculture. I did
this with the firm belief that we can't afford to let
China turn inward again. That we have to push to open
China's markets.
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And push to eventually get them into the WTO.
This much I can tell you: the status quo will not
stand.
In talks with university economists, private
consultants and businesspeople working in China, it's
clear to me that Chinese officials are protecting their
economy from the Asian economic flu. The Chinese
worry about their economy as they lay off workers at
State-Owned Enterprises.
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At the same time, their tradition of maintaining a
self-contained economy - producing everything they
need - looms large as we try to pry open their
markets. Thus, they are backsliding in their ag sector,
continuing to subsidize production and barring private
firms from the distribution network.
The bureaucratic inertia on WTO accession and
opening markets was frustrating to me, the
congressional delegation and American officials on the
trip. It's clear we're far from our goal of getting them
to move. And as U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky
said to the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing,
WTO accession won't be on political terms.
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It will be on economic terms - when China makes
progress on transparency, high tariffs, ag barriers, halts
piracy, and simplifies its bureaucracy.
Without significant movement on these issues in
the future, the good feelings between our two
countries will dissipate and our relationship will
crumble.
That said, we must capitalize on the momentum
created by the trip to improve our trade relationship.
The Chinese got a lot out of this tripkNow they need to
reciprocate.
1 2
What can we do to get China to move toward
WTO accession.
We need to be respectful -- and tough. Tougher
than we have been in the past.
Most of the reforms we hope to see in the near
future include: lower tariffs and quotas, with a
particular emphasis on the rule of law; fewer subsidies;
and a more open and market-driven economy. But how
do we achieve these modest goals? There are three
levers.
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First, China must have a material incentive to enter
the WTO. I still believe that the Administration should
endorse, and Congress pass, a law to make permanent
Normal Trading Relations status automatic when China
enters the WTO.
But is China ready to enter the World Trade
Organization this year, next year or in the next decade?
They're not acting like it. China's ministries seem to
be thinking over WTO accession at leisure, with no
penalties for delay.
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Those of us who support engagement with China
are finding ourselves increasingly frustrated with a
country whose Great Wall is more than just a world
wonder\lt is a brick wall we keep running into. I told
them in no uncertain terms that they need to lower
their barriers, or there will be repercussions.
Some have argued we should lower the bar for
China to enter the WTO. That's a bad idea. If we allow
them to enter on lesser terms now, when they are
backsliding, we would be offering them incentive to
wait longer. China's accession must reflect real
reform.
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The second lever: China must have a moral
incentive to enter the WTO. So with our bilateral talks
on Taiwan's membership complete the Administration
should push for Taiwan's rapid entry into the WTO,
regardless of where talks with China stand.
We know from history and our recent trip to China
that officials there are very sensitive about Taiwan, and
our relationship with that country.!We know that China
has opposed Taiwan becoming a member of the WTO
before it does.
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But, as you know, Taiwan has willingly worked
toward WTO accession, and made all the necessary
concessions to become a full-fledged member. They
want to play ball. We can get China's attention if we
ress for Taiwan's immediate WTO accession -- d
demonstrating that China's delay has a cost. /,
And the third lever we have to initiate reform:
China must see a price for unnecessary delay in
entering WTO. So we should keep the option of
opening a broad market access case ner Section
of our trade law nearby. And, we need to let China
know that we are serious about invoking Section 301 if
they don't move forward on market access.
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The good feelings engendered by this trip can
continue. But China must go beyond a fundamental
basic interest of avoiding conflict and become a
responsible international player that can address issues
that further promote peace and prosperity. There is
much room for improvement.
CHINA AS A POLITICAL ISSUE
Our relationship with China is also political.
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Certainly those of us in the U.S. Senate who have
been long-time advocates of Normal Trade Relations (or
MFN) with China are getting fed up. The lack of
progress in market access, distribution and our
alarming trade deficit have done nothing to deter our
critics.
Moreover, with congressional division over trade
and our China policy, future engagement with China --
ncluding WTO accessi - may become a divisive
sue in the esidential camhe
consequences of that are hard to predict.
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But ever since the 1 950s and the "who lost China"
debate, when China policy has become a political issue,
thcnsequences of politicizing the China issue)have
generally been bad.
That doesn't mean we should stifle debate on our
China policy. Just that we do it in a productive fashion
and not et swamped in partisan bickeringland political
one-ups-man-ship. That we do what's right to secure
American interests.
Few foreign relationships affect the American
people as much as this one. It's important that we get
it right.
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CONCLUSION
Finally, we -- in Congress and the American public
-- need to reach an agreement on how we treat our
China policy. That essentially means when we reach a
basic consensus on such a policy that we do not then
play political games with it.
I believe that Congress must work oa r
basis to develop a comprehensive, rational and
insightful China policy as we wrap up this Congress
and enter the 1 0 6 th
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Senator Hagel and I are co-chairing an ad hoc group of
senators who think that America needs a bipartisan
foreign policy. One that is constructive rather than
destructive. One that has America's best interests at
heart, rather than politics at its root.
Our bottom line is the same as former Secretary of
State James Baker'sLt's do what's best forA
Let's work together - Congress and the executive
branch. Democrats and Republicans.
For the American public, I would offer the
challenge of taking a more active stand in encouraging
Chinese reform.
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Those of you here today have set a fine example of
finding a niche in a neophyte marketplace. However, I
would ask you today to think out of the box. That is to
say: ask yourselfow your enterprise can contribute to
Chia'sintrnal developmet
Can you clean up th eby investing in
clean technologies? Can you promote human rights by
setting higher standards in labor practices? Can you
enlighten by education? Lead by example?
And if you do that, what do you get in return?
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A healthy China that is ready for accession to the
World Trade Organization on a mutually acceptable
basis and a market that is ready, willing and able to do
business.
Together, as we engage China, we must keep
American values and interests in mind. We need to
show the Chinese that we want to be strategic
partners on security issues. We must expect that they
will improve their environment and human rights
records. And, we must demonstrate over and over
again that we are serious -- firm and tough -- about
gaining access to their markets.
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Through this historic trip, we advanced America's
interests. We didn't get all we wanted. For a country
that has more millennia under its belt than we have
centuries under ours, progress is bound to be slow.
But we have significantly improved our relationship
with the world's most populous nation. And engaged
them in a constructive dialogue that I hope will bode
well for America, China and the world.
Thank you.
Now I will take questions.
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